Benefit-sharing: an inquiry regarding the meaning and limits of the concept in human genetic research by unknown
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2005, Vol.1, No.2, pp.29–40. 
 
_____________ 29
Benefit-sharing: an inquiry regarding the meaning and limits of the 






The Human Genome Project and the related research and development activities have 
raised heated discussions around some very basic ethical and social issues. A much 
debated concern is that of justice in human genetic research and in possible 
applications, especially pertaining to questions of just benefit-sharing - who and based 
on what sort of argumentation has the right to require benefits arising from research 
and discoveries, and what can even be considered as benefits? In what follows I will 
be examining and clarifying the notion of benefit-sharing by focusing on its 
justifications. I will argue for certain qualifications and limitations in using this 
concept in specific and universal contexts.  
 
The idea of benefit-sharing 
 
Social justice has been first and foremost discussed as distributive justice or the 
sharing of benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Some objects of distribution 
(goods, services, duties) aspire to universal status, some are particular to a specific 
cultural, geographic, religious or other context, ultimately leaving the society or 
community handling the distribution as the measure by which certain goods become 
valued.  It has generally been agreed that some goods or benefits like food and shelter 
are valued in all societies but the list is almost endless, including rights and liberties, 
money and commodities, jobs and opportunities, medical care, education, honours and 
prizes, personal security, special privileges, resources and so on.  
 
How does research in human genetics link up with the discussions of benefit-sharing 
and justice? It has been suggested that the potential harm of the genetic revolution 
may rather lie in the ability of technology to distribute the available resources even 
more unequally than is currently the case, and in that way enforce and strengthen the 
existing disparities and inequity.1 On the other hand it is suggested that genetics 
might have enormous potential in levelling the existing inequalities and providing for 
a more just and equitable existence. Few would dispute that the impact the application 
of genetics might have in specific societies, as well as in a global context, owes much 
to the way its fruits, as well as its burdens, will be distributed.  Hence the rise of the 
benefit-sharing concept, as most would agree that the potential for both greater good 
and greater harm is there. 
 
There are also views that dispute the application of a benefit-sharing framework 
within genetics, and these are mostly related to a perception that discussions of 
benefit-sharing actually legitimate the attempts to commercialize and profit from 
(human) genome. This approach could be based on an understanding that genetic 
research is part of a larger humanistic project of medicine, where financial or other 
incentives should recede before important values like human health and quality of life.  
If human genetic research is about locating genes, understanding their functions and 
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possibly attempting to modify these with the aim of treating or preventing the 
occurrence of the gene-related disease,2 it might seem curious why there are such 
heated debates on benefit-sharing.3 After all, so far, the understanding has been that 
the results of scientific inquiries suffice as the benefits are then available to the public. 
What has become of the concept of altruism in medical research? Why shouldn’t we 
nowadays continue this honourable tradition of volunteering to help science to 
progress, so that future generations may have a life of less pain and illness? Indeed, 
some might feel offended when their honest altruistic participation is answered with 
the promise of a benefit. “That it not why I am doing it”, people would say. 
 
I think we can distinguish several counterarguments against this reasoning. Firstly, 
discussions of benefit-sharing are necessary even if one disagrees with the underlying 
trends of commercialising the genome, as closing ones eyes to a certain existing and 
increasingly powerful “evil” does not make it disappear. Also, non-engagement with 
the issue is an option that only some can afford, and not so for populations or 
communities already in the midst of genetic mining. Thirdly, we should also consider 
seriously the possibility that medical research itself has changed considerably and is 
consequently not an arena of altruism it perhaps used to be. 
 
Defining benefits or sharing what, exactly? 
 
Benefit-sharing is not a concept that has been invented for the explicit use in human 
genetic research (or genetics) and the origins of the discussion can be traced in 
various international documents:  
 
• UN International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Article 15,1b): “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications”;  
 
• UN Convention on Biological Diversity (Article 17,7): “Each Contracting 
Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures /…/ with the 
aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and 
development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other 
utilization of genetic resources /…/”; 
 
• UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome (Article 12a): “Benefits from 
advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, 
shall be made available to all, with due regard for the dignity and human 
rights of each individual”; (Article 19a,iii): “In the framework of international 
co-operation with developing countries, States should seek to encourage 
measures enabling: countries to benefit from the achievements of scientific 
and technological research so that their use in favour of economic and social 
progress can be to the benefit of all”.  
 
The HUGO ethics committee expressed in its statement on benefit-sharing the 
following: “A benefit is a good that contributes to the well-being of an individual 
and/or a given community (e.g. by region, tribe, disease-group...). Benefits transcend 
avoidance of harm (non-maleficence) in so far as they promote the welfare of an 
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individual and/or of a community. Thus, a benefit is not identical with profit in the 
monetary or economic sense. Determining a benefit depends on needs, values, 
priorities and cultural expectations.” Firstly, benefit is clearly a positive change for 
the recipient(s) and should not be defined as simply providing a neutral result, with 
the insistence that potential burden was avoided. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
definition recognizes that benefits or goods cannot be established as neutral or 
objective facts but are inherently value-laden.  
 
This is to say that behind the possibilities that are suggested as benefits (or burdens), 
lay understandings about why these things would be beneficial (or burdensome). And 
they are beneficial of course because they are valued as such, accepted by specific 
people, communities, societies. There are values that are shared by many, and then 
there are ones that test the limits of cultural relativism. All decisions, principles, 
perspectives within assessing the benefits and burdens are dependent on where one is 
looking from, and the values and benefit-sharing principles themselves can be traced 
to various understandings of justice – be it liberal, communitarian, utilitarian, 
egalitarian, libertarian etc. These perceptions include both political bias and moral 
judgement, and thus even the most general benefit-for-all is essentially value-based 
(as it values giving the benefit to all, and not only to the needy, for example).  
 
The rhetoric, the media hype, the trusted position of scientists and researchers 
construct an arrangement that values and disvalues certain aspects of social life. 
Probably the most popular and popularised example of a benefit arising from human 
genetic research concerns health, be it individual (personalised medicine, 
pharmacogenomics) or public health related (preventive medicine, genetic screenings 
of embryos etc). Health is seemingly a non-controversial good that we all would be 
happy to have, or at least to improve on. Thus, generally speaking, within genetic 
research it is assumed that health is one such benefit accepted by certain, or even 
most, societies. But how are we then to assess the case from Finland where 10% of 
the young men attending their compulsory national service were found to have 
problematic dental health (large number of cavities)? 4 This is in a country where free 
dental care had been available to all and I do not believe we are dealing with extreme 
forms of cultural specificity, as Finland surely qualifies as a democratic country, with 
general values at least shared with other Western countries.  
 
It has been argued, that “the choice of risks and the choice of how we live are taken 
together”,5 and I believe the same is true of hoped-for benefits. Similarly to the ways 
people choose to selectively pay attention to risks, they are also selective in defining 
benefits.  Perhaps not surprisingly, those with dental problems came from the lower 
socio-economic strata of the society, and researchers attributed their disregard towards 
dental care to the values and lack of motivation of their strata. There is of course the 
slogan of “educating” them to the benefits of good dental health, but at the same time 
it is obvious that the problem was really not in education but rather, in the fact that 
they did not value free dental care enough to take advantage of it.6 Thus in our 
assessment of potential benefits and burdens, it is essential to realize that these 
conceptions are not a matter of education, as if the providing of “sufficient” 
information would guarantee the commonality of argument and perception. I think 
this sort of cautious attitude is especially important to keep in mind as regards the 
many potential “genetic” products that have been speculated about in the media, 
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especially pertaining to different lifestyle, feel-good-smart-beautiful drugs and 
therapies. 
 
The discussion above is not meant to attack genetics as irrelevant or unable to provide 
“real” benefits, but it does point to an important detail that should be accounted for in 
the benefit-sharing discussion. The example above also points to an important 
conclusion that 90% of the Finnish population do value dental health and thus insists 
that values, while different, can still be and are shared. The difficult aim of the just 
benefit-sharing would then be to take into account the diversity without ignoring the 
shared values. Secondly, careful attention needs to be paid to the question of who is 
defining and deciding upon specific benefits to be shared, but this is a point I will be 
unable to elaborate on presently. 
 
Benefits put forward by the scientists, as well as the pharma industry, patients, 
investors and public health officials span a wide array of potential valued “goods”, 
starting from improved health and scientific knowledge to financial gains and wider 
social benefits. What is behind the notions of benefits of genetic research that are 
utilized in various discussions? The HUGO definition is rather vague and I think 
intended to be such, but below I sketch an outline of issues that have been named as 
benefits by various actors internationally. This overview is by no means exhaustive 
but rather illustrative. 
  
 Health Commercial Scientific 





Communal level  Relief to disease-
related populations 
etc 







policy planning etc 
Development of 
biotech and related 
sectors, new jobs 
etc  







knowledge as a 
value in itself, 
regardless of the 
fact whether it is 
useful to humans 
 
The table demonstrates the all-encompassing scope of the hopes and dreams we have 
with respect to developments in genetic research. The question now is, what would be 
the basis or rationale for the sharing of these benefits? And here various, even 
competing justifications can be distinguished. 
 
 
Sharing on what basis? 
 
From the abovementioned international documents as well as from various other 
sources, I have sketched below some relevant strands of reasoning that the calls for 
benefit-sharing could be based on: 
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.1 No.2 (2005) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© CESAGen, Lancaster University, UK. 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 




1) Benefit-sharing as compensation for risk(s) taken. This aspect is currently 
clearly more relevant in clinical trials where risks can be rather direct and serious, 
especially as new medical interventions are tried out and evaluated. Human genetic 
research currently involves mostly giving of various samples, and risks have so far 
been more theoretical - discrimination based on one’s genetic makeup, concerns of 
privacy and of psychological stress when genetic tests reveal a potential disease 
without the possibility for cure. Benefit-sharing in this instance would be a 
compensatory activity geared towards those who have taken risks that are necessary 
for research to take place and to possibly succeed. (Besides health risks, for example, 
the financial risks of investors can also be considered under this reasoning). 
 
2) Benefit-sharing discussions in the context of genetic research are characterized 
by another aspect that focuses on compensatory arguments based on the notion of 
property.  The world’s agricultural sector has had the earliest experiences with this 
aspect of benefit-sharing.  There exist numerous examples of cases where the results 
of the research and developing activities accomplished throughout the centuries by 
local communities are seized by big industry (as a rule originating from the 
industrialized country), and the latter has the available resources to allow it to ‘cross 
the finish line’ and capitalize alone on a certain product through patenting.7 Once the 
patent has been granted, the local community from a developing country has no 
means or resources to challenge the situation. Thus the goods are extracted from 
poorer countries, labelled as someone’s property and often very little or nothing goes 
back to the communities that have originally contributed. Bioprospecting or perhaps 
biopiracy? Therefore one of the arguments behind benefit-sharing refers to the past 
and present inequalities of power and resources in the world, that are capitalized upon 
by big international corporations, creating and enforcing further injustice between the 
developing and industrialized countries. Benefit-sharing here is an attempt to change 
or at least alleviate this situation by putting forward essentially rectifying arguments 
that are based on some sort of notion of property and the utilization of that property. 
 
The subject matter of human genetic material as property is a much debated one. This 
is either conceptualized as a shared property in human genome, or alternatively, as 
property in one’s own personal genome. The UNESCO declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights established genome as a heritage of humanity in a 
symbolic sense, such wording specifically not being capable of supporting legal 
action. In reality, the abovementioned declaration, as well as others that stress the 
need for benefit-sharing, (e.g. the HUGO Statement on the Principled Conduct of 
Genetic Research), exist side by side with others that directly contradict the ideas and 
principles embedded in the former (like the WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of 
International Property Rights, the TRIPs agreement). Thus while the notion of shared 
property in human genome has been established symbolically, the parallel 
conventions detail out the private ownership rights and duties in utmost practicality, 
with pharmaceutical companies owning patents on human genes and cell lines. 
 
However, private ownership does not seem to imply personal ownership. The first 
infamous legal case in establishing a property right in one’s bodily material concluded 
that even if one would own the specific cells in one’s body, this did not mean that the 
cell lines derived from it would also be owned.8 The owner(s) of the genetic data have 
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not done anything to make their property valuable and therefore, at least in terms of 
patenting, should not have similar rights as researchers who have added value to it9 - 
a sort of Lockean understanding of mixing one’s labour with natural resources.10 
David Townend has concluded that the only function that the property right in one’s 
own genetic information can have, is that of a shield.11 That is, property right in this 
case allows for protection only, and not for exploitation, selling or buying.  The 
ongoing patenting of human gene sequences allows for the property argument but 
mostly not on behalf of individuals or communities.  
 
3)  Compensation for fairness as a basis for benefit-sharing refers to a 
realization that increasingly some aspects of medicine are not as altruistic as they used 
to be. Certainly not all medicine can straightforwardly be equated with business but 
the developments in genetics have brought this characteristic to the forefront, and 
gradually our hopes and dreams in medicine are linked up with the rather expensive 
promises of genetics. The medical industry has become big business - the 
pharmaceutical trade sector, for example, has for a while been the most profitable in 
the world.12 Perhaps benefit-sharing has become such an issue because people have 
realized that their volunteering is not matched with altruism from the other side, and 
consequently compensation for fairness is required?  If big profits are made, then a 
feeling of fairness would ask for a sharing with participants.  
 
Historically, rewards or incentives for research participation were outlawed in order to 
ensure that no coercion or pressure was put on the volunteers. Much of the benefit-
sharing discussion, with the exception of the HUGO statement, has so far mostly been 
silent on that aspect, although it is clear that the promised benefits might have direct 
relevance to the participation decision. Presently, compensation for fairness as a moral 
argument seems to be the strongest basis for benefit-sharing and thus supported by 
various international documents. Compensation for fairness usually includes various 
international and social justice concerns, and here the justification for benefit-sharing 
is a moral one - those who have the power and are able to act in alleviating suffering 
have the moral obligation of doing so, based on concepts of solidarity and justice.13 
But the question of who exactly is responsible for such activities is unclear. More 
specific examples of moral duties that are relevant here include:  
 
• Duty not to exploit the vulnerable (Nuffield Council) 14 refers to the duty to 
abstain from taking advantage of the unequal circumstances of power, 
resources and opportunities in this world, a negative duty to refrain.  
 
• Duty to alleviate suffering (Nuffield Council) points to the necessity of 
providing benefits to those in need, a sort of positive requirement for those 
who have the power to act. 
 
• Special moral obligations of medical enterprises. Human health is a 
fundamental value, a base upon which much else in life can be built. This is an 
idea that the HUGO ethics committee referred to when suggesting, in its 
statement on benefit-sharing, that companies involved in health care and 
medicine might have special moral obligations that other enterprises do not 
have. Genetic research and its applications were initially clearly situated in the 
sphere of medicine, suggesting that benefits should be allocated based on 
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need. However, for the past decade, the investments into biomedical research 
have increasingly been originating from private enterprises, and the 
distributive principles of the business-world (like desert and merit) are 
increasingly influential within genetic research. From a justice point of view 
there is a conflict between health care and business in terms of their 
distributive principles.15 As in genetic research the spheres of health care and 
business overlap, the principles of need and desert create conflicts with both 
sides utilizing the arguments of justice for their own cause.  
 
So should participants refer to charity and benevolence when discussing benefit-
sharing or should they feel entitled to a profit based on ownership rights and justice 
concerns? Whether it is compensation for risks taken, for fairness’ sake or for having 
contributed their property for the research, entitlement to some benefits can in 
principle be justified. When genetic research is viewed as a for-profit activity then 
certainly business relationships can be applied. True, it is a special kind of business, 
having to do with human life and death issues. It is the very sensitivity of this 
particular area that causes difficulties for benefit-sharing discussions.  
 
Sharing with whom?  
 
An understanding that benefit-sharing can be justified through different arguments 
does not say much about how this framework should be applied. Traditionally, in a 
medical context, benefit-sharing has centred on research participants, be it individuals, 
families or (increasingly) communities. How is that focus on research participants 
justified in genetic research? The intergenerational nature of genetic information also 
engages other people besides those directly participating. If taking risks has been an 
appropriate argument for benefit-sharing among those directly involved, then genetic 
research might also create risks for those people who have not been participating. The 
content of the notion of risk is increasingly difficult to pin down where genetic 
information is concerned, which suggests that while risk-taking was useful for 
regulating benefit-sharing within traditional medical research, it might not be a 
suitable justification in many instances of genetic research. 
 
The property argument for benefit-sharing has been most successfully applied in cases 
of communities and nations (usually having to do with non-human genetic resources). 
Possibly some specific cases of monogenetic diseases can also rely on this argument, 
at least implicitly. For example, disease-advocacy groups in the US have in some 
instances been successful in negotiating for direct benefits, as their contributions are 
easier to prove.16 But their argument for sharing can also be based on the notion of 
fairness.  
 
Fairness and various justice-related concepts are notoriously difficult to agree on, and 
the complex nature of genetic information hampers the successful application of this 
concept in benefit-sharing further. Whose concerns are to be taken as relevant? In 
small-scale clinical drug trials this is easier to assess compared to large population-
based genetic databases, where significant social concerns might arise.17 
Subsequently I would draw attention to a very close dependency between how we 
justify benefit-sharing and who those are to be shared with. This works both ways – 
whether we start with abstract justification that will determine the circle of those to 
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whom it applies; or whether we are concerned with certain individuals, communities, 
peoples etc., and therefore argue for a benefit-sharing principle that would take their 
interests into account. For example, when we consider the genome to be a common 
property of humanity, the sharing should clearly be done among all human beings. An 
understanding that these aspects of benefit-sharing are closely linked is important to 
keep in mind. Some of the uncertainties and doubts that have accompanied the 
benefit-sharing discussion in human genetic research might have to do with the fact 
that some justificatory arguments are not efficient in including the interests of relevant 
populations. For example, benefit-sharing arguments based on international injustice 
might not fit so well with the public concerns regarding research conducted in 
industrialized countries. 
 
By drawing on parallels with clinical research I have so far focused mostly on benefit-
sharing among research participants, but other possibilities have been argued for. In 
recent years, the discussions regarding benefit-sharing in human genetic research have 
increasingly stressed that everyone should benefit, and that the entire humankind 
should be involved in the sharing.18 Here the concept is employed to fight the 
activities of patenting and commercialization that monopolize and limit access to the 
results of genetic research.  The right to benefit from genetic research would then be 
based on a fact that humans share 99% of the genome. To quote Ortứzar: “ there is no 
reason to confer benefit exclusively on the population which is the subject of the 
research /…/ all benefit derived from genetic research on populations should be 
available to anyone in need of the health improvement offered by it.”19 Indeed, 
benefits to participants can be seen as unfair from the point of view of universal 
benefit-sharing.  
 
I believe it is necessary to distinguish two different aspects in the benefit-sharing 
framework. At least a differentiation needs to be made between the universal  list of 
benefits mentioned in the table above - that describes the entire positive potential of 
the genetic enterprise - and a specific benefit-sharing framework directed towards 
those who directly participate in research. I believe these two issues need to be kept 
separately if we still want to make use of the sharing framework. By differentiating 
between universal and specific sharing, much confusion is avoided because many 
benefit-sharing arguments function only in specific context, whereas others have 
relevance in universal context.  
 
Limitations of universal benefit-sharing framework 
 
Calls for universal benefit-sharing have been based on concerns for justice in an 
international genetic research situation. The agricultural background to benefit-
sharing can possibly explain some tendencies that have characterized this discussion 
within human genetics. Namely, the presupposition that in genetic research (in 
parallel with agriculture, and say, mining) there exist certain clear-cut and tangible 
benefits and/or resources that can be easily assessed, accessed and distributed. The 
assumption that benefits are out there, almost graspable, disregards the social context 
of human genetics and the controversial nature, as well as the mere potentiality, of 
many benefits. Because of the amount of hype that has surrounded human genetics (in 
comparison to plant and animal genetics), many overoptimistic visions as well as 
nightmares have become regarded as rather realistic benefits and burdens.  
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Benefit-sharing seems to be on the one hand fuelled by feelings of injustice emerging 
from the inequalities of power between the global medical and pharmaceutical 
industry and the resource-rich less developed countries; on the other hand the scene 
has been much influenced by the often over-hyped visions of grand future 
developments. I think that benefit-sharing discussion in genetics would not have 
gained such prominent status if it was not for the previously existing global injustices 
that are not directly linked to genetic research. I refer to a larger background of 
current world inequalities in terms of opportunities and resources that stem from 
various sources, be it inherited from colonization experience or the international 
establishment of market-oriented liberal capitalism that favours certain prominent 
players and regulations in the ordering of our world. The dissatisfaction that forms the 
basis for a universal benefit-sharing requirement is larger than only genetic research 
allows for.  It is clear that benefit-sharing is hoped somewhat to address this 
dissatisfaction, despite the fact that much of it stems from areas not connected to 
genetic research. To my mind the problem is that a benefit-sharing framework is not 
able to respond adequately to those concerns that surface from this larger background 
of injustice issues.  Genetics is not only a health issue, and even health itself does not 
contain the various aspects of human existence that are relevant from the justice point 
of view. 
 
Different political and economic instruments can be and should be utilized once there 
is political will to seriously deal with existing injustices and inequalities in the world. 
But I fear that benefit-sharing as a framework originating from research lacks 
coherent strength, and might be simply inadequate for enforcing the claims that are 
currently made within it to alleviate the widening gap between the industrialized and 
developing countries. If the patenting system is unfair, then benefit-sharing is not able 
to challenge that unfairness sufficiently, but rather, policy changes are required.  
Benefit-sharing should be used to its maximum potential, including, if possible, the 
sharing of benefits to those not directly involved, but that will not even be a remotely 
adequate solution for the international justice predicament. Below I have attempted to 
draw out some concerns that ground my scepticism regarding the inadequacy of a 
benefit-sharing framework in this universal-benefit-for-humanity context.  
 
Benefits from genetic research, despite being potentially very widely applicable and 
relevant to human health, will only be capable of addressing a limited cluster of health 
care issues. Applications based on traditional (meaning non-genetic) medicine, 
improvements in hygiene and nutrition are still more useful in helping the populations 
of developing countries to achieve better health and quality of life. Currently, around 
800 million people, or 18% of the world’s population go hungry every day and suffer 
the related consequences to their health; 1.1 billion do not have access to safe water.20 
Thus, even very generous redistributive actions resulting from genetic research or new 
medical research will not have the effects that are sorely needed and hoped for in the 
international situation. It is the fair provision of most basic medicine that would 
benefit the populations of developing countries. This of course raises the question 
whether shared benefits would necessarily have to be related to, or result from, 
genetic research. Possibly benefit-sharing in genetic research could allow for anything 
to be shared, as long as it is defined as a benefit by a substantial amount of 
stakeholders. On the other hand, this only illustrates the concern I alluded to above – 
namely that benefits distributed via genetic research (whether they themselves are 
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“genetic” or not) are not in any way a sufficient measure to alleviate the problems 
where genetic research forms only a minor part, or indeed, is only a symptom and not 
a cause. And it should not be forgotten that many of these hoped-for benefits currently 
constitute little more than heavily hyped visions of the contingent human enterprise of 
science. 
 
Secondly, much of the discussion in benefit-sharing discourse is ambiguous and 
incoherent, as it utilizes several arguments that exclude each other. Thus it can be 
easily dismissed or ‘dealt with’ through dispersing with  a few coloured ribbons and 
glass-beads, so to speak. After all, fairness and justice are very difficult to pin down 
and agree on. Many would refer to a certain ‘gut-feeling’ that in principle benefits are 
due in return for a contribution, but in the complexities of genetic research these are in 
many cases very hard to establish. Monogenetic diseases (where contributions would 
perhaps be easier to distinguish) are very rare, and most of the genetics-related 
expectations are linked to discoveries in the common complex diseases. Research on 
these diseases, especially because they are strongly linked to environmental factors, 
will necessarily involve very many participants and samples. Involvement of hundreds 
and thousands would be needed even to start contemplating any relations between a 
disease outbreak, DNA and environmental factors. This also means that tracking 
someone’s individual contribution would be unthinkable. The quality here really 
comes with quantity.  
 
It is difficult to fathom that universal benefit-sharing based on the universal property 
argument is realizable. Presently the symbolic heritage of humanity is privatized with 
increasing speed to companies, research agencies and others. Even if appropriate laws 
were changed, it is open to discussion what entitlements this would create as regards 
benefits. It could be argued that no-one can be excluded from enjoying benefits (and 
this is already demanded now - see the quotes from the beginning of the article), but it 
is much more complicated to argue for anything more substantial, at least based on the 
notion of property. The notion of global public goods or the human rights discourse 
has a better chance in distributing the needed resources. Compensation for risk cannot 
be highly relevant in universal sharing, as risks in medical projects traditionally 
involve limited number of participants. Even if communities or populations are 
engaged (for example in setting up population based genetic databases), universal 
sharing is still not relevant within this risk-based reasoning. Compensation for 
fairness is too vague, at least within genetic research, as its potential is bound by the 
specific research protocols and by particular issues under investigation. It lacks 
coherence and complexity to be successful outside of these limits to tackle the real 
causes for rallying behind benefit-sharing.21
 
My final reason for scepticism regarding the universal applicability of benefit-sharing 
framework in genetics is a pragmatic one. If the currently most powerful universal 
discourse – that of human rights - is only slowly improving the international situation 
regarding human health and quality of life satisfactorily, then the rather specific line 
of benefit-sharing thought originating from the uneasy mixture of research and 
business activities, does not look very promising. However, this is a conclusion 
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Ted Schrecker has insisted that any “responsible ethical analysis must not regard 
crucial background elements of the social and economic context /…/ as too big to 
change” and has urged the linking of benefit-sharing discussion with the critique of 
“market fundamentalism”.22 What I hope to have done is precisely the investigation 
of this link. My conclusions however state the theoretical and practical inadequacy of 
the benefit-sharing concept to deal with these large scale issues.  
 
This does not mean that the battle for a more just world is lost - it simply needs more 
suitable and more powerful “weapons”. Unfailing and consistent political pressure on 
the enforcement of so-called second generation or socio-economic rights is important 
in the context of health care. On the other hand, the implementation of these rights is 
very much dependent on the available resources of countries. Therefore simply 
pressure on rights discourse is inadequate without the inclusion of more systematic 
critical approaches to tackling the global structural inequalities. For example, the way 
international copyright and trade regulations function in reproducing and enforcing 
the age old disparities between the industrialized and developing countries should be 
challenged. These rules are by no means neutral or even fair.23 I believe that these 
approaches are better equipped to address the concerns that have been behind much of 
the engagement for benefit-sharing of the technological and biomedical developments 
on a more universal level.  It is the investigation and application of these frameworks 
that have a better chance in dealing with global inequalities, both because they are 
better grounded theoretically and because their implications are much wider than the 
limited areas of benefit-sharing of genetic or even biomedical research results. This 
research promises, and hopefully will deliver, a lot, but the improvement in the health 
and condition of humankind cannot be achieved with the focus on a rather ambiguous 
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